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Public engagement with climate
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A long history of interdisciplinary research highlights the powerful role that human
values play in shaping individuals’ engagement with environmental issues. That
certain values are supportive of proenvironmental orientation and behavior is
now well established. But as the challenge of communicating the risks of climate
change has grown increasingly urgent, there has been a rise in interest around
how values shape public engagement with this issue. In the current paper, we
review the growing body of work that explores the role of human values (and the
closely related concept of cultural worldviews) in public engagement with climate
change. Following a brief conceptual overview of values and their relationship to
environmental engagement in general, we then provide a review of the literature
linking value-orientations and engagement with climate change. We also review
both academic and ‘gray’ literature from civil society organizations that has focused
on how public messages about climate change should be framed, and discuss the
significance of research on human values for climate change communication
strategies. © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
As the risks posed by anthropogenic climate changehave become increasingly well documented,1
the urgency of engaging the public around these
risks has grown.2–5 Research has focused on a
wide variety of topics, including the congruence
between proenvironmental attitudes and behavior6;
the ideological determinants of climate change
risk perceptions7; the social factors affecting the
performance of low-carbon behaviors8; the many
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situational influences on beliefs about climate change
and how to mitigate it9; and, of course, human values.
However, despite several significant overviews and
summaries of research on public engagement with
climate change,3,4,10–12 there has been no systematic
review of the role of human values in shaping public
engagement with climate change. This is surprising,
given the recent rise in interest around this issue.13–17
The renewed interest has been driven by a seemingly
simple question: are there certain values on which
public engagement with climate change is (or should
be) predicated?
In this paper, we attempt to answer this
question by reviewing the empirical literature on
human values and public engagement with climate
change. In the first section, we identify a variety of
ways in which values have been conceptualized, and
briefly describe how values are related to general
environmental attitudes and behaviors. Next, we
review the literature on the role of values in public
engagement with climate change specifically. We
also review both academic and ‘gray’ literature from
civil society organizations that has focused on how
public messages about climate change should be
© 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
Focus Article wires.wiley.com/climatechange
framed (including closely related research on cultural
worldviews and risk perceptions),18 and finally,
highlight the significance and implications of research
on human values for improving the effectiveness of
communication strategies.
VALUES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
There is a large body of literature, stretching back
at least three decades and encompassing disciplines
including economics, anthropology, sociology, philos-
ophy, and psychology, that has sought to understand
and explain the relationship between people’s values
and how they engage with the natural environment.
Inevitably, the approaches taken by scholars from
these different disciplines have emphasized multi-
ple theoretical and conceptual frameworks, some of
which we explore below. It is critical to draw a distinc-
tion at the outset, however, between ‘human values’
and the economic concept of ‘valuation’.
The idea of valuation derives from economic
and decision theory and equates an individual’s
values with preferences that are either ‘revealed’ by
direct observation of what market actors choose or
do, or ‘stated’ in surveys of what people say they
prefer—thereby providing a direct measure of value.19
For many issues concerning the environment a series
of fundamental objections have been raised to this
market-based approach to measuring values,20–22 and
while the economic preference approach is undoubt-
edly useful for informing some difficult health and
environmental policy decisions,23 it avoids the theo-
retical question of why things should be as they are
for people beyond the operation of individual or col-
lective choices, making it less useful for understanding
the relationship between people’s underlying values
and issues such as climate change. In the remainder of
the paper, therefore, we exclude this economic notion
of value from further discussion and analysis.
The first attempt to systematically define and
measure values was the seminal work of Rokeach,24,25
who described both ‘terminal’ (that is, desirable
end states of existence) and ‘instrumental’ (that is,
preferable modes of behavior) values. However, a
value is usually defined by social psychologists as a
‘guiding principle in the life of a person’, following
the description employed by Shalom Schwartz and
his colleagues in a major program of theoretical and
empirical research (drawing on Rokeach’s terminal
values in particular) that spanned several decades,
44 nations and over 25,000 respondents.24,26,27 In
contrast to the economic concept of valuation, human
values are assumed to be relatively stable dimensions
of individuals’ personalities and behavior, rather than
transient preferences (although they may shift over
individuals’ lifespans28; or indeed generationally in
response to socio-cultural changes29).
Schwartz identified 56 ‘universal’ values that
can be divided into four distinct clusters which vary
along two basic dimensions. These two dimensions
are openness to change (including self-direction
and stimulation) versus a desire to conserve/respect
tradition (including security and conformity); and self-
transcendence (including altruism, forgiveness, and
loyalty) versus self-enhancement (including power,
ambition and hedonism). Although people possess a
range of different and sometimes conflicting values,
those who identify strongly with self-enhancing
values (e.g. materialism, personal ambition) tend
not to identify strongly with self-transcending values
(e.g. benevolence, respect for the environment), and
vice-versa.26 Subsequent work drawing directly on
Schwartz’s inventory has refined and shortened the
56 item scale,30 but the core distinction between
self-transcendent and self-enhancing value orienta-
tions has continued to play an important role in
values research to this day (including, as we shall
describe in the next section, public engagement with
climate change).
However, although the Schwartz conceptualisa-
tion of values is now dominant in social psychology,
other researchers have taken values theorizing and
measurement in slightly different directions. DeGroot
and Steg31 divided the same initial inventory into three
broad clusters of values: egoistic (i.e. self-focused),
biospheric (i.e. environmentally focused) and altru-
istic (i.e. others-focused; see also Ref 30). Other
scholars have posited an alternative set of items that
capture the closely related concepts of ecocentrism
and anthropocentricism,32 or introduced a distinction
between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ motivations.33
Inglehart focused on Rockeach’s instrumental rather
than terminal values,29,34 describing a set of ‘post-
materialist’ values that have emerged in industrialized
economies which have experienced growing affluence
and economic/political security. Other sociological
treatments—often distinct from the empirical work
described above—have tended to focus on the idea
that values are a latent means of evaluating the social
world35,36 which are explicitly motivational (in that
they help to privilege certain actions or outcomes37).
A focus on altruism is a reoccurring theme
across many of the different social–psychological
and sociological approaches to values.38–40 Altruistic
and biospheric values are sometimes considered to
be broadly equivalent to Schwartz’s self-transcendent
and conservation groupings, while egoistic values
appear to fit within the self-enhancement cluster.
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However, despite some clear parallels between these
groupings, these classification structures do not
map precisely on to each other, and they frequently
co-exist in the literature.
An alternative conception derives from
anthropology, and more specifically Douglas and
Wildavsky’s cultural theory of risk.41 According
to this approach, values (more commonly called
cultural worldviews) exist on two cross-cutting
dimensions and describe people’s orientation towards
different societal arrangements. The first, ‘hierarchy-
egalitarianism,’ refers to a cultural preference for an
equitable division of resources (i.e. irrespective of
gender, race or religion). The second, ‘individualism-
communitarianism,’ relates to the question of
whether individual interests should be subordinated
to collective ones.
Within philosophy, values are typically consid-
ered to be a form of ethics—that is, an abstract set of
moral principles which when reflected on allow us to
arbitrate between situational preferences which might
otherwise compete.42,43 This philosophical conception
of values (although at odds with the psychological
assumption that values are latent or not consciously
considered) has an intuitive resonance in everyday dis-
course. Finally, it is possible to consider values through
the lens of formal political ideology.33,44 There is
no straightforward way of reconciling the multiple
conceptions of human values that exist across these
multiple literatures, as they draw on different intellec-
tual traditions and make different assumptions about
human behavior and its drivers. Previous reviews37,39
have more comprehensively delineated the strands of
scholarship that we briefly describe here. However,
a common interest among scholars utilizing diver-
gent theories of human values is the question of
how they relate to people’s engagement with envi-
ronmental risks.1 And here, these conceptually dis-
parate approaches converge on some well-established
conclusions—specifically, that certain types of values
are predictive of positive engagement with environ-
mental issues, while others are not.
Values are generally considered to be indi-
rectly related to proenvironmental behavior, albeit
as part of a causal cognitive chain that includes
domain-specific beliefs, particular behavioral norms,
and stated intentions.6 They may often only account
for a small fraction of the variation observed in
any given proenvironmental behavior.45,46 Neverthe-
less, there are some consistent patterns of relation
between the values that people hold and their engage-
ment with environmental issues. In particular, people
who endorse self-transcendent values and who exhibit
high levels of altruism are more likely to: engage
in sustainable behavior;31,47–51 show higher concern
about environmental risks;52 perform specific actions
such as recycling;53 engage in indirect and direct polit-
ical engagement on environmental issues49,54 and, as
we discuss in detail in the next section, engage posi-
tively with climate change. Different cultural world-
views have also been consistently associated with envi-
ronmental risk perceptions: the more people endorse
hierarchical and individualistic worldviews, the more
they are likely to downplay environmental risks.55–57
Given that the personal values that individuals
hold are central determinants of environmental risk
perceptions, and that climate change is in many ways
simply a specific instantiation of the category ‘environ-
mental risk,’39 it is perhaps unsurprising that values
should also play a central role in determining public
engagement with climate change. In fact, it is difficult
to draw a precise distinction between research that
examines the link between values and general proenvi-
ronmental engagement (e.g. energy-saving regardless
of motivation, involvement in an antilittering initia-
tive, or taking part in a campaign to protect forest
land) and research linking values and engagement
with climate change specifically (although see Ref 49
for a useful delineation of different forms of environ-
mental engagement and proenvironmental behavior).
However, following Lorenzoni et al.2 (as well as most
other literature in this area), we limit our review in
the following section to studies that examine the link
between values and intentional public engagement
with climate change rather than environmental atti-
tudes or behaviors in general (i.e. proenvironmental
behavior regardless of the motivation).
VALUES AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
WITH CLIMATE CHANGE
Although there is a great deal of literature on pub-
lic perceptions of climate change that predates it,
the first publication to explicitly examine the rela-
tionship between values and beliefs about climate
change focused on predicting acceptance of policy
measures aimed at mitigating climate change.58 The
study found that willingness to accept policy measures
was positively related to self-transcendent values. At
around the same time, and also focusing on willing-
ness to support specific policy prescriptions for climate
change mitigation, Dietz et al.59 reported that altruism
(a self-transcendent value) was positively (although
indirectly) associated with policy support (the effect
was mediated by environmental attitudes). Subse-
quent research conducted since these initial studies
has confirmed that people who endorse biospheric and
altruistic (i.e., self-transcendent) values are more likely
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to report concern about the risks and consequences of
climate change60,61 and are less likely to be skeptical
about the reality or seriousness of the problem.62 In a
qualitative study exploring in detail the attitudes and
values of a small group of individuals who had made
significant behavioral adjustments to their lifestyles in
response to climate change,16 concerns relating to bio-
spheric values were found to be secondary to altruistic
ones as motivations of behavior. Although concern
about ‘the environment’ for its own sake motivated
some people in the study, more dominant was the per-
ceived social injustice that climate change would bring.
Beyond the now well-established cluster of
self-transcendent values that predict positive views
towards climate change, reflecting the relationship
between self-transcendent values and environmental
beliefs in general, Dietz et al.59 found a weaker (but
still significant) relationship between the endorsement
of certain traditional values (such as honoring one’s
parents, or showing respect) and willingness to
support climate change policies. However, the rela-
tionship between ‘traditional’ values such as these and
engagement with climate change is ambiguous—other
studies have linked the endorsement of traditional val-
ues such as conformity and security to higher levels of
skepticism about the reality or seriousness of climate
change.32 This ambiguous relationship between tradi-
tional values and engagement with climate change is
likely to provide one of the explanations for the con-
sistent association between climate change skepticism
and political conservatism.48,62,63 Although there is
no unitary form of political conservatism—especially
when considered across different nations—it tends to
incorporate a respect for tradition.
In fact, differences in levels of climate change
engagement across societal groups defined by their
political ideology or cultural worldviews41 have
been documented by multiple researchers over the
past decade,64,65 with some of these differences
appearing to have grown in recent years.65 In a
recent series of studies, individuals with stronger
egalitarian and communitarian worldviews were
found to perceive climate change as riskier than
those with individualistic and hierarchical values.55–57
Egalitarian–communitarians also perceived a more
urgent need for ameliorative action and were more
supportive of climate policies that restrained market
freedom (e.g. regulation of industry). In contrast,
individualistic and hierarchical individuals tended to
be more supportive of climate policies that maintained
the autonomy of the free market (e.g. enhanced
nuclear power capacity or geoengineering55).
Similarly, McCright and Dunlap63 demonstrated
significant differences between US citizens who
self-identified as Republicans and Democrats with
respect to basic beliefs about climate change (i.e.
whether it is happening), risk perceptions and
willingness to take ameliorative action or support
mitigation policy. There is an important question,
therefore, regarding the conceptual overlap (and by
extension unique contribution) of cultural worldview
measures vis-a`-vis partisan ideology (and indeed value
orientations64,65). However, resolving this issue is
beyond the scope of this review (Box 1).
BOX 1
THE ROLE OF VALUES IN PUBLIC
ENGAGEMENT WITH CLIMATE CHANGE:
HOW FAR DOES THE RESEARCH
GENERALIZE?
Research on international public perceptions of
climate change is now starting to proliferate,66
but there is only a limited amount of
research examining the role of values in public
engagement with climate change in non-
Western nations. At a general level, concern
about climate change is highest in nations
(e.g. Brazil, Bangladesh) that are likely to be
most vulnerable to its impacts.66 Many non-
Western nations are more collectivist (and less
individually-oriented) in terms of their culture,67
and so the tension between proenvironmental
messages and individualism may be less apparent
than in strongly individualist nations like the
United States.68 Several reports on public
engagement with climate change in African
countries like Uganda have pointed to the
importance of communicating climate change in
ways that resonate with religious or indigenous
values and beliefs,69,70 while an analysis of a
large sample of the Indian population used
ratings of egalitarian and individualistic value-
statements as one criteria for identifying six
distinct interpretative communities for climate
change communication (mirroring similar work
with the US public71).
Although different contemporary cultures
may rank the relative importance of various val-
ues differently, the structure of values has been
shown empirically to be nearly universal.26,39
There is no reason to assume that a simi-
lar relationship between self-transcendent/self-
enhancing values and engagement with climate
change would not be found in non-Western cul-
tures. Clearly, however, this is an important area
for further research.
© 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
WIREs Climate Change Public engagement with climate change
These findings appear to provide strong evidence
in favor of the ‘interpretative’ effects of values on
climate engagement: the values we hold influence
how we interpret the information we are exposed to
about climate change in ways that lead us to either
accept or reject the need for greater engagement and
action. Leiserowitz and his colleagues have taken this
argument a step further, identifying six ‘interpretive
communities’ within the United States which reflect
varying levels of belief in and engagement with climate
change (from the most engaged ‘Alarmed’ group to
the most skeptical ‘Dismissive’ group72). Moreover,
because political ideology is closely related to the
values and worldviews that people hold, these and
other effects point to the important role that values
play in driving much of the political and cultural
polarization observed in the climate change domain.
One way that values and worldviews shape
climate engagement (and partisan polarization)
is by acting as filters on the interpretation
of the information to which individuals are
exposed about climate change. Utilizing a modified
version of Schwartz’ norm-activation model, Stern
et al.73 argued that beliefs about ‘emergent attitude
objects’ (e.g. a new environmental issue such as
climate change) are often developed in response
to individuals asking themselves, ‘What are the
implications of this object for the thing I value
most?’ (p. 1615). Thus, specific beliefs or feelings
about climate change are derived from initial
perceptions people form regarding the implications
of climate change for the values that they strongly
endorse, which is to say, the implications for
the lives and choices of ‘people like them’.74,75
These initial and often rapid perceptions in turn
powerfully shape engagement and policy support
(Box 2).76–78
BOX 2
THE ROLE OF VALUES IN ADAPTATION
In the same way that values play an important
role in how people view the risks and
consequences of climate change,62,63 the effects
of climate change are likely to have profound
impacts on cultural and personal values79
and people’s views about adaptation.80 A
growing body of literature has begun to
argue that climate change risk assessments—and
recommendations about adaptation—must pay
more attention to social valuations as well as
economic ones if policies are to be effective.79
An analysis by O’Brien and Wolf81 focused
specifically on the potential for conflict if
certain values are prioritized over others in
adaptation policies (e.g. through techno-centric
rather than more socially grounded responses).
The acceptability of adaptation policies hinges
crucially on what people consider to be worth
preserving or achieving through adaptation
policies—that is, the things that they value.
For example, drawing on interviews with
two remote communities in subarctic Canada,
Wolf et al.82 showed that values such as
tradition, freedom, harmony and safety affected
individual interpretations of climate impacts,
and led to distinct views on how to adapt to
them. Graham et al.83 analyzed the ‘lived values’
(including health, safety and belongingness) that
would be threatened in communities at risk
from sea-level rise. The authors argued that
these social values are as much at risk from
sea-level rise as physical commodities like land
or property, and that they are likely to be critical
in determining public perceptions of how to
respond to climate impacts.
All of this suggests that the extent to which
climate change can be made to seem congruent with
an individual’s or group’s values is likely to determine
the effectiveness of communication strategies. In the
next section, we review work asking how messages
about climate change should be framed for effective
public engagement.
VALUES AND THE FRAMING OF
CAMPAIGNS ABOUT CLIMATE
CHANGE
All information is ‘framed’ by the context in which it
appears84; such framing can be either intentional or
unintentional on the part of the communicator. For
example, putting a financial value on an endangered
species, and building an economic case for their
conservation ‘commodifies’ them, and makes them
equivalent (at the level of the frame used to
communicate about them) to other assets of the same
value (like a hotel chain13). This is a very different
frame to one that attempts to achieve the same
conservation goals through, for example, emphasizing
the intrinsic value of a rare animal species—that is, as
something that should be protected in its own right.
As the previous section demonstrates, there
has been a rise in academic interest in how
value orientations shape engagement with climate
change. However, there has been perhaps even
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greater interest among practitioners of climate
change communication—that is, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), civil society groups and
government officials—eager to understand how to
more effectively engage the public on this issue.
Values are relatively stable across the adult lifespan,
and so are unlikely to be changed by message-
based campaigns to promote public engagement with
climate change in the short-term85 (although as
we discuss in the final section, more deliberative
processes may engage and even alter values over
time86). Reflecting this, there have been two primary
trends in values-based climate change campaigning in
recent years: firstly, to promote messages primarily
oriented towards self-transcendent values (which
are likely to resonate with the membership of
environmental organizations, but may not have
broader cultural transfer); and secondly, to identify
the values that target populations actually hold
(whatever they are—even if they include values known
to be incongruent with environmental engagement,
such as materialism) and try to match campaign
messages to those values (a strategy known as ‘social
marketing’87). We discuss each of these strategies
in turn.
Driven by the priorities and principles of large
environmental organizations like Greenpeace and
Friends of the Earth, a great deal of initial public
messaging tended to highlight biospheric or self-
transcendent aspects of the challenge of climate
change. Images of stranded polar bears, rhetoric
about ‘saving the planet’ and guilt or fear-based
messaging around consumption have all been popular
strategies.88 This approach clearly frames the problem
as an issue of social justice, animal welfare, or
inequality of consumption. Framing the issue in
these terms, while factually accurate, has worked to
associate climate change with certain cultural values
(e.g. self-transcendence, altruism) while ignoring or
explicitly denigrating others (e.g. materialism or
hedonism). One unintended result of this is that public
engagement with climate change has become polarized
along values-based lines: individuals and groups that
tend to strongly endorse self-transcendent values have
come to view climate change as a serious problem
requiring immediate ameliorative action, while those
who more strongly endorse self-enhancement values
have come to view action on climate change as an
(implicit) attack on their values, and something that
should only be pursued if it is in their individual
self-interest.56,58
In response to the growing realization among
campaigners and practitioners that climate change
messages have not effectively reached large swaths of
the general public (internationally), there has been a
more recent trend for environmental NGOs, as well
as governmental actors, to adopt the principles of
social marketing—that is, the systematic application
of concepts and strategies used to market physical
products in order to achieve prosocial behavioral
goals.89 Central among these principles is the idea that
the audience of a campaign should be ‘segmented’ into
different groups based on differences in their attitudes
or values, and that the message of the campaign
should be tailored to these different groups. The
techniques and strategies of social marketing have
been shown to be successful in promoting some
limited changes in proenvironmental behaviors, and
have been pursued by a wide range of actors seeking
to engage the pubic on climate change.90 However,
because social marketing advocates framing messages
about climate change according to the dominant
values of the target audience, such efforts can lead
to paradoxical situations whereby values known to
be incongruent with engagement with climate change
(e.g. materialism) are used as the basis of campaigns to
engage the public.91 In particular, it has become very
common for campaigns aimed at promoting climate-
friendly behavior to emphasize the economic benefits
of doing so, rather than the environmental ones.92
Highlighting the central role of human values
in the debate about how best to engage the public
around climate change, a series of publications
associated with the environmental campaigner Tom
Crompton have challenged the legitimacy of the social
marketing approach.13,92,93 The central argument of
Crompton and his colleagues’ work is that given the
negative relationship between self-enhancing values
and engagement with environmental issues, these
sorts of campaigns—although potentially effective
for producing small scale, piecemeal and short-term
behavioral changes—undermine the ‘common cause’
on which all campaigns on ‘bigger than self’ issues
like climate change ultimately depend, namely, the
activation of self-transcendent values in the general
population.13,94
One testable hypothesis arising from Cromp-
ton’s work is that focusing on self-enhancing values
will make behavioral ‘spillover’—that is, the transfer-
ence of positive engagement with climate change from
one behavior to another—less likely (because the orig-
inal behavior was only performed for economic gain,
not out of environmental concern93). Evans et al.15
provided the first direct empirical test of this ‘spillover’
hypothesis for proenvironmental behavior, priming
participants with either environmental, financial or a
combination of both types of reasons as motivation
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for car-sharing, and then measuring the level of subse-
quent energy-saving actions participants engaged in.
Participants that had been primed with environmental
reasons for car-sharing were more likely to recycle
their materials at the end of the experiment than par-
ticipants who had been primed with either financial,
or a mixture of financial and environmental reasons
for car sharing.
The values embedded in messages about climate
change have also become the focus of research
that has sought to understand how to overcome
partisan and other divides on climate change.
Several studies with US citizens have suggested
that reframing climate change as a public health
problem—for example because of declining air
and water quality—might be an effective way of
reaching audiences who would normally avoid or
even dismiss the issue.95 One recent study found
that simply labeling energy efficient lightbulbs with
an environmental message was sufficient to reduce
purchasing rates among conservatives.96 Another
study found that conservatives were more favorable
towards environmental messages when these focused
on pollution, and the ‘purity’ of the natural
environment, rather than the more conventional set
of arguments about a moral responsibility to avoid
harm.97
Similarly, a recent report for the Climate
Outreach and Information Network98 argued for
the importance of identifying the overlap between
the values underpinning British political conservatism
and those which are congruent with sustainability,
such as an emphasis on community well-being,
intergenerational duty and a representation of the
environment not as a ‘service provider’ but as
something that people have a duty to protect. And in
one recent small-scale study of Conservative voters in
the UK, messages about low-carbon transport policies
produced lower levels of fatalism and a greater sense
of responsibility when they were framed using self-
transcending (rather than self-enhancing) conservative
values such as the beauty of local landscapes.99
Reflecting some of the findings above, deliberative and
survey work for the UK Energy Research Centre100
has also revealed a core set of values that people wish
to see reflected in any future energy system designed
to meet the challenges of climate change and energy
security (including protection of nature, fairness and
respect for the autonomy of individuals, and a positive
contribution to future well-being as well as efficiency,
the avoidance of waste, and long term thinking).
We have described the two dominant approaches
to values-based communication of climate change over
the past decade. The key insight of the social marketing
approach is to tailor the content of a campaign to the
values of the target audience—no matter what they
are. However, the empirical evidence shows that self-
transcendent values are congruent (and self-enhancing
values incongruent) with positive engagement with
climate change. On the face of it, these two conclusions
are difficult to reconcile. However, although value-
based differences between individuals and groups
exert an important influence over the effectiveness of
climate change communication, very few individuals
hold only one set of values entirely at the expense of
the other—and even individuals who score highly
on measures of materialism have been shown to
identify with and be receptive to messages framed
using self-transcendent values (at least, under certain
conditions101). Critical, therefore, is the extent to
which particular values are activated and primed by
communications.47,94,102
The challenge for climate change communicators
seeking to make the most effective use of research on
human values is to identify ways of bridging between
the diverse values that any given group of individu-
als holds and the values that are congruent with a
more sustainable society. Coupling, for example, val-
ues around security or freedom with self-transcending
values like concern for the welfare of others is one
possible way of resolving the tension between the
social marketing and ‘common cause’ approaches to
campaigning, and making best use of the available
academic evidence.103,104 In addition, it is now well
established that communication strategies based on
‘one way’ message-oriented communication tend to be
ineffective at fostering significant and sustained behav-
ioral engagement87,105,106 They may also promote
polarized views through ‘biased assimilation’ of the
message content by opposing attitudinal groups.107
The habits and social practices of individuals
and groups provide the context in which value-
based messages are received, yet the vast majority
of public communication around climate change has
involved individuals, and not much consideration of
the social context.108,109 It follows, therefore, that
if attempts to engage the public more effectively on
climate change are to utilize insights from research on
human values, these insights would be best applied in
more participatory, group level, situations.99 In fact,
there is evidence that deliberative processes themselves
promote more altruistic evaluations of environmental
issues like climate change.86,110–112
CONCLUSION
Despite the relatively short space of time in which
climate change has occupied a prominent place in
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public and policy discourse, a substantial literature
focusing on the role played by human values in
determining public engagement with climate change
has quickly emerged. The contribution of the current
paper has been to provide the first review of this
literature, as well as discussing a number of important
practical implications for campaigns and initiatives
seeking to engage the public around climate change.
Although there are multiple overlapping (and
sometimes competing) theoretical definitions of what
values are, and how they can be measured, a
relatively clear message arises from this literature:
there are certain clusters of values which are strongly
predictive of positive engagement with climate change
(in particular, self-transcendent/altruistic values),
and others (self-enhancing values) that appear less
congruent with sustained, long-term engagement. This
conclusion is to be expected given the significant body
of previous work that has shown a link between these
types of values and engagement with environmental
risks in general. But this review also points to some
issues that are particular to public engagement with
climate change.
Firstly, the degree of political polarization that
has developed around climate change (in some
Western countries, at least) reflects the fact that
disagreements about climate change are more likely
to be about values than about the underlying
science—even though the science is often used as a
proxy for these values-based disputes.113 Although
values are fairly abstract concepts, one way in which
they are instantiated is through formal political
ideologies, which are likely to be more or less
favorable to particular climate policies. Thus, a
great deal of research has focused on understanding
patterns of public perceptions derived primarily
from values-based differences in political judgments
about climate policies. Secondly, nonacademic ‘gray’
literature from civil society organizations has played
a central role in the debate about how human
values shape public engagement with climate change.
Practitioner-led debates about how to use the findings
of academic research on values in messages aimed
at engaging the public on climate change have in
turn led to increased interest among academics in
the subject. And finally, research has started to move
beyond simply documenting how values correspond
with attitudinal variables such as levels of concern
about climate change, and to adopt more explicitly
normative goals, such as investigating how messages
about climate change might be framed to appeal
to citizens who do not identify with traditionally
‘proenvironmental’ ideas, or how more substantive
behavioral engagement can be promoted among the
general public.
The role of human values in public engagement
with climate change presents a unique window on the
subtle and reciprocal relationship between academic
research and the societal problems it is often designed
to address: the normative concerns and aims of
campaigners have fed directly into academic research,
which has in turn elucidated the sorts of values that a
more sustainable society might be grounded in. Given
the continuing urgency of developing a society-wide
response to climate change, it seems likely that the
trajectory of research in this field will continue in this
direction—at the interface between primary research
and practical problem solving).
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